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Introduction
Of all regions in the world, the Balkans are perhaps the most profoundly affected by
history. By this, I do not mean one history but a concatenation of different histories –
each with its own logic and set of values. For Greece, the overwhelming contempo-
rary history has produced a ‘fear of Albanians’, in both a personal security sense and
also in the sense of their possible role in the Greek polity. Its immediate precursor was
the 45-year long isolation of the cold war, when the inviolable border between north-
ern1 and southern Epirus lay forgotten like a distant memory from the past. Prior to
that was the refusal of the Greeks of Northern Epirus in 1913 to become part of the
newly-formed Albania, their formation of a provisional autonomous government
(Pentzopoulos, 2002: 28) and the subsequent failure of the Greek delegation at the
Paris Conference of 1919 to achieve annexation of the territory to Greece (Veremis,
1995: 16-17), a long-established claim of Greek territorial right (Koliopoulos and
Veremis, 2002: 331). Even further back lies the centuries-long stability of the Otto-
man Empire and the complex relations between different ethnic communities within
it. Thus, when we read that ‘borders in this region induce a feeling of nationalism’
(Alkan, 2002: 59) and that the traditional political culture of the Balkans embodies
‘collectivism, authoritarianism, animosity to individual rights and to ethnic and reli-
gious diversity and differences’ (Aligica, 2003: 307), we should understand that mass
migration within the Balkan region is almost certain to show a different character than
in other places.
In this paper, I try to give an outline of the modern history of Albanian migration
to Greece, the role of Albanians in the Greek economy, policy measures by the Greek
state and the complex reactions of Greek society. I conclude with a brief synthesis of
these different approaches since, in the case of Greece especially, their separation is
somewhat artificial.
Albanian emigration to Greece
Our attention is focused on Albanian emigratory flows in the 1990s after the collapse
of the communist regime, but we should be aware that migration into Greece is not a
new phenomenon for Albanians. In the late 19th century, they would travel by foot
across the Greek mountains for seasonal work in textile and agricultural businesses in
Greece (Psimmenos and Kassimati, 2004). This was itself a continuation of an age-
1 Northern Epirus roughly corresponds to the southern-most districts of Korçë and Gji-
rokastër in Albania. The number of ethnic Greeks there is highly contested, but was re-
corded as 40 000 in the 1961 Census (Poulton, 1991: 195). The 1989 Census estimated
the minority at 59 000, although the Greek government claimed it to be at least 300 000
(Pastore, 1998: Fn. 7).Martin Baldwin-Edwards
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old practice of temporary labour migration – known as kurbet – in the Ottoman area, a
tradition which is strongly represented in Albanian folklore and music (Mai and
Schwander-Sievers, 2003: 945). The Arvanites in Greece are the historical legacy of
such Ottoman migrations and constituted a significant part of the tiny populace of
Athens at the birth of the modern Greek state in 1830. A wave of Albanian migrations
started in 1912 after the Balkan Wars and continued until 1945, when the new post-
war regime prohibited emigration (Martin et al., 2002: 107).
In 1991, groups of several tens of thousands of Albanian migrants fled as asylum-
seekers to Italy, where the first group was accepted but a later one rejected (Martin et
al., 2002: 105). A similar number crossed the mountain borders into Greece. The im-
mediate Greek response was near-hysterical, with allegations of the terrible criminal-
ity of Albanians and the need to secure the borders against them (Baldwin-Edwards,
2004: 3). However, the illegal flow of Albanians continued, despite a new repressive
law in 1991 and despite mass expulsions2 of hundreds of thousands of Albanians
every year. By 1998, some 240 000 Albanians had registered for legalisation (under
the so-called ‘white card’), representing 65% of the non-EU, ‘non-ethnic Greek’ alien
population resident in Greece. The 2001 Census counted 440 000 Albanians3 – again
around 65% of the non-EU, ‘non-ethnic Greek’ aliens – of which 46 000 (excluding
ethnic Greek Albanians) were registered as school students (Anthopoulou, 2004). By
2001, over two million immigrants (mainly Albanian) had been expelled without le-
gal process for not being in possession of legal residence permits. However, as has
been demonstrated repeatedly in academic analyses, there were, in reality, no legal
routes for immigration into Greece: the 1991 Immigration Law aimed at excluding all
immigration, regardless of the economic need for workers in Greece (Baldwin-Ed-
wards and Fakiolas, 1999).
The initial entry of Albanians into Greece in 1991 was via the mountainous border
but, by the late 1990s, it was not clear that this was, in fact, an easy route nor that it
had been possible for the many women and children resident in Greece to have en-
tered by this means. Nicholson notes the various routes and costs of entry into Greece,
including smuggling and trafficking. However, the principal route of entry in 2001
and 2002 seems to have been by way of underground visas from the Greek consulate
in Tiranë – at a cost of around £1 000 (Nicholson, 2002: 440). Nicholson also notes
that legally-obtained visas are cancelled by the Greek police without reason whereas
smuggling routes constitute better value for money as the smugglers do not demand
payment until successful delivery (Nicholson, 2002: 439). Thus, we might expect
2 There seems to be no legal basis for these expulsions which the Ministry of Public Order
has recently re-deﬁned as ‘redirections’. A lack of respect for the law on the part of state
actors, particularly laws concerning individual rights, is a serious and continuing problem
in Greece.
3 In theory, this ﬁgure should include ethnic Greek Albanians without Greek citizenship.
However, owing to the highly ethnocentric behaviour of Greek census collectors, it is al-
most certain that many were counted as Greeks if they had a good command of the Greek
language. Thus, the number of Albanians may be higher than recorded.Albanian emigration and the Greek labour market: Economic symbiosis and social ambiguity
53 1/2004 South-East Europe Review
women and children to have entered Greece through underground visas, smuggling
routes and through being trafficked,4 whereas men are more likely to have undertaken
the difficult mountain-border crossings. Almost no serious research has been done on
this (or on any other topic of Greek immigration management), but a survey of 500
Albanians in Thessaloniki in 2000 (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001) revealed that all
of the women had entered legally, although mostly overstaying the validity of their vi-
sas, while more than half the men had entered, and remained, illegally. A similar ratio
was observed by Hatziprokopiou (2003) in 2001-2 with a small sample of 30 Albani-
ans.
By January 2004, after three legalisation programmes and two framework immi-
gration laws in 1991 and 2001, the number of valid residence permits held by Albani-
ans was a mere 143 000.5 The number of Special Permits held by ethnic Greek Alba-
nians is unknown, as the Ministry of Public Order refuses to give such information on
the grounds of ‘national security’. King and Mai (2002) give a figure of 80 000 who
had applied for the Card, although this figure seems quite high and may include many
non-genuine applicants. Given the census figure of 440  000 Albanians, of which
390 000 adults, presumably, need permits (along with the figure of 240 000 who had
applied in 1998), the latest data suggest that either many Albanians have left Greece
since 2001 (for which there is no evidence) or that there are now in 2004 at least
250 000 illegally resident Albanians in Greece.
Albanians in the Greek economy
Given the predominantly illegal status of (Albanian) immigrants in Greece through-
out the 1990s and, for that matter, well into the 21st century, it should be evident that
serious and systematic research would be required to understand the employment ac-
tivities of several hundred thousand illegal workers. Furthermore, the Greek economy
has the largest shadow economy of any EU country – typically estimated at 28-35% –
and, as in the rest of southern Europe, illegal immigrants are attractive for their cheap
and illegal labour (Baldwin-Edwards, 1999). In fact, not only has there been no sys-
tematic research undertaken but there has also been no real understanding of the em-
ployment of Greeks in the economy, and no statistical data on work permits,
residence permits or other such information up at least as far as January 2004. The
Greek state has financed a small number of partial projects through traditional politi-
cal party clientelist channels although the conclusions of such research are, automati-
cally, in question.
The earliest such study (Lianos et al., 1996), conducted in 1993, looked only at
northern Greece and concluded that 22% of unskilled farm work had been taken over
by immigrants, that there was little substitution of immigrant for native workers but a
4 For detailed accounts of some of the horriﬁc aspects of trafﬁcking in women and children
into Greece, see Emke-Poulopoulou (2001), Lazaridis (2001) and Psimmenos (2000).
5 For these and all statistical data on immigrants in Greece, the only comprehensive pub-
lished source in Greek or English is that provided by the author, on the website of the
Mediterranean Migration Observatory: http://www.mmo.gr Martin Baldwin-Edwards
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large potential net contribution in the construction sector of 1% of GDP. Later,
smaller pieces of research6 tended to confirm this general picture, with two additional
conclusions: that about 20% of immigrants in small businesses were actually keeping
such businesses afloat; and that the geographical proximity to Albania determined lo-
cal supply-demand ratios and wage levels in farm work (Baldwin-Edwards and Safil-
ios-Rothschild, 1999: 214). The previously-mentioned study of Albanians in Thessal-
oniki in 2000 (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001)7 established a better temporal
understanding of Albanian employment in Greece: over just a few years, through in-
creased ability in the Greek language and a better understanding of employment pos-
sibilities, the Albanians in their sample tended to move out of unskilled farm work
and rapidly into construction, small firm employment, technicians’ work and trans-
port services. Eighty two per cent of the sample held steady employment, with 57%
paying regular social insurance. Of the men, 30% worked in construction and 24% in
industrial small companies; women tended to work as domestic cleaners (27%) while
a quite high, and increasing, proportion (28%) were housekeepers.
The 2001 census data tend to confirm this picture for the whole Greek economy,
suggesting a significant shift of the locus of immigrant – primarily Albanian – em-
ployment by the late 1990s. The first Chart below indicates the self-declared profes-
sions of male Albanian workers, numbering some 170 000, while the second shows
the pattern of female employment.
6 These are reported in Baldwin-Edwards and Saﬁlios-Rothschild (1999).
7 The main ﬁndings are reported in English in Lyberaki (2004).Albanian emigration and the Greek labour market: Economic symbiosis and social ambiguity
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The predominant area of male employment is construction (42%), followed by ag-
riculture (23%) and industry and tourism at 12% each. In contrast, 52% of women de-
clared the category ‘other’, mainly, presumably, housekeeping while 19% worked in
tourism, 15% in agriculture and 9% in industry. Only 54 000 women declared them-
selves as working out of 182 000 in the census.8
Additional information is contained in the registrations for social insurance with
IKA, the main state agency.9 About 14% of IKA members are without Greek citizen-
ship, of which half are Albanians. In employment in sectors other than construction,
there are 95 000 insured Albanians; for construction, there are 80 000, representing
30% of all insured construction workers. We can suppose that the actual employment
of Albanians in the shadow economy is more extensive than this, especially in the
construction sector which has been booming amidst preparations for the 2004 Olym-
pic Games in Greece.
Immigrants in Greece work in a highly-segmented labour market, in temporary,
part-time, heavy or dangerous occupations – the jobs that Greeks refuse to do, espe-
cially in construction, heavy industry and agriculture. Essentially, the role of immi-
grants in southern Europe has been to compensate, on a temporary basis, for structural
defects in labour markets (Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). These defects are of three types:
8 Allowing for 25-30 000 female children out of the 182 000, this suggests a participation
rate of only 36%.
9 Agricultural workers and the self-employed are covered by other agencies which appar-
ently do not collect data.Martin Baldwin-Edwards
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• insufﬁcient labour supply
• inﬂexible labour markets through over-regulation
• uncompetitive low-productivity sectors.
Over time, immigrants have been able to improve their situation and increase earn-
ings, as suggested above: however, this is not to concur with the idyllic conclusions
offered by Labrianidis and Lyberaki (2001). Immigrant employment is almost solely
in the secondary sector, regardless of skill levels; is frequently under-insured or ille-
gal; and often takes places in abusive conditions (Psimmenos and Kassimati, 2004).
Furthermore, the prognosis for this employment after the construction boom of 2004
is not good, as for employment generally in Greece. Limited anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that some Albanian migrant workers are preparing for the worst and may leave
Greece. Additionally, the lack of legal status of so many immigrant workers (see be-
low) can be seen as a deliberate policy option by the Greek state to expel a future ex-
cess labour supply.
The role of the Greek state
Elsewhere (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas, 1999; Baldwin-Edwards, 2004), I have
argued that Greek immigration policy since 1991 has been fundamentally exclusion-
ary, with no evaluation of labour market needs and no realistic possibility of legal im-
migration from Balkan countries. Furthermore, this policy arena can be seen as a
contest between three competing forces10 – traditionalist, xenophobic and protection-
ist interests; modernising technocratic and competition-promoting lobbyists; and ex-
ternal interests, primarily regional Balkan matters and relations with the EU. This
analysis can still be maintained, although the principal results seem to have come
from the first, conservative lobby.
Another approach to Greek policy is suggested by Jordan et al., 2003. Taking as a
starting point the illegal presence of immigrants, they examine the bureaucratic im-
plementation of the first legalisation process, which started in 1998. Their conclu-
sions are remarkable in that they identify a:
Complex culture of discretion…[with] nationalist and neo-entrepreneurial overtone. [State of-
ﬁcials] do not perceive immigrants as their clients, but the local employers and Greek society
as a whole…Their practices are informed by preconceptions of cultural ‘authenticity’ and
ethnic and cultural prejudices. (Jordan et al., 2003: 383)
In this ‘culture of discretion’, the temporary staff recruited to deal with immi-
grants were not only untrained, but themselves started to develop informal networks
of personalised contacts and financial corruption, alongside the neo-liberal values of
efficiency and competitiveness. In other words, this is a mix of traditional Balkan/
Greek practices along with some modern values – but always prioritising personal
ideology/interests and Greek cultural preferences. Other research conducted by
Panteion University11 on ‘gate-keepers’ also confirms the cultural stereotyping in
10 See Aligica (2003) for a comparable dualistic analysis of all policy areas in Balkan coun-
tries.Albanian emigration and the Greek labour market: Economic symbiosis and social ambiguity
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state agencies, in which immigrants are seen as ‘undesirable’ through their nationality
(particularly Albanian and other Balkan) and are frequently denied legal status or
work as a consequence.
The landmark policy initiatives in Greek immigration policy are the following:
• 1991 Immigration Law
• 1998 legalisation procedures (white card and green card)
• 2001 Immigration Law and legalisation procedure
The 1991 Law was little more than a policy of exclusion and expulsion specifically
aimed at Albanians.
The 1998 legalisation, in its final negotiating stages, was blocked from encom-
passing Albanians by a government minister; however, this was later overturned by
the Prime Minister (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas, 1999: 192). A similar desire to
exclude all Albanians from legal status has been noted for prefectures bordering Al-
bania in commentaries which were submitted on the proposed 1998 legalisation
(Baldwin-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild, 1999: 216). The eventual programme had
372 000 applicants for the six-month ‘white card’ but the excess number of demands
acted to reduce the number of applicants for a ‘green card’ to 228 000. The green card
was generally awarded for a one-year duration, occasionally two, but only very poor
data have been released on actual grants of legal status. My own calculations suggest
that there were never more than 170 000 legalised immigrants at any one time, and
even this was not achieved until April 2001. Reasons for this very low figure are con-
tained in the above-mentioned research of Psimmenos and Kasimati (reported in Jor-
dan et al., 2003); the heavily bureaucratic procedures, which made great demands on
both applicant and state; and the short duration of the permits granted – usually one or
two years.
The 2001 Law made little innovation other than devolving to local authorities the
power to grant one-year work and residence permits, as well as introducing the com-
mon EU pattern of requiring immigrants to apply for work permits at overseas consu-
lates. This Law also contained a last-minute legalisation process, conceding a six-
month ‘green12 card’ to applicants. The Greek state has released no data at all on the
results of this process but it is generally reported in the Greek press that it has been a
complete fiasco, with few receiving legal status and, often, only after the expiry of
permits. The transition from ‘green cards’ to work and residence permits, as required
by the 2001 Law, has also been seriously problematic. A particular difficulty has been
with the renewal of work permits which, in the law, requires no more than registration
for social insurance and regular employment.13 Essentially, legal ambiguities created
opportunities for the ‘culture of discretion’ and for the openly xenophobic enactment
of public policy by individual officials, as well as for corruption in selling illegitimate
11 EQUAL: ‘IFESTOS’ programme, results not yet published.
12 One might wonder at the choice and meaning of these colours. At one point in the late
1990s, it was announced that no more green cards could be given out because the Greek
state had run out of green card, so perhaps the chosen colours reﬂect existing stockpiles
of coloured paper in Greece.Martin Baldwin-Edwards
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work permits.14 The number of applicants for work permits in 2002 was recorded as
351 000 – a figure which sits well with the census declaration of around 360 000
workers without EU nationality or ethnic Greek status. By January 2004, only
228 000 valid residence permits15 existed – reflecting the extreme difficulty faced by
immigrants in acquiring legal status.
In summary, Greek policy on immigrants contains an exclusionary ideology as re-
gards all others than ethnic Greeks. The various legalisation initiatives have been im-
plemented by untrained officials with an explicitly nationalist and xenophobic men-
tality and, reportedly, in abusive circumstances. The entire legal framework for
immigration, of entry (in an overseas consulate), of legal work and stay (formerly
with OAED16 and now with local government) and of legal residence (formerly the
Ministry of Public Order and now the Ministry of Interior), is fundamentally hostile to
immigrants and beset by corruption. There is a continuous history of systematic cor-
ruption and abuse by Greek state officials, in consulates, ministries, the police, and
other agencies – this also includes the trafficking and sexual exploitation of women
by state officials (Baldwin-Edwards and Fakiolas, 1999: 197-8). It seems that the Eu-
ropean Commission has made no effort to pressure Greece into reform: only the
heavy-handed humiliations dealt by the US government have yielded any positive re-
sults in anti-trafficking measures. However, the xenophobic immigration measures
look set to remain or, even, worsen.
Albanians in Greek society
From their very first arrival in Greece, Albanian migrants were stigmatised as ‘crimi-
nals’ by the Greek media and became stereotyped as ‘dangerous Albanians’ (Karydis,
1992). Newspapers cast Albanians as:
…“‘cunning’, ‘primitive’ and above all ‘untrustworthy’, a source of danger and threat”. These
stereotypes…coincided with Alia’s amnesty to a couple of hundred political prisoners in
1991. Newspapers like Ethnos published articles about the released prisoners who would
commit various crimes once they enter the country. (Lazaridis and Wickens, 1999: 648)
13 This is the ofﬁcial position of the Ombudsman’s Ofﬁce and of the Ministry of Interior; it
was opposed by the former PASOK General Secretary of the Ministry of Labour, who is-
sued circulars with ambiguous demands for evidence of actual levels of social insurance
contributions for the renewal of work permits. Without a work permit, the Interior Minis-
try cannot normally issue a residence permit.
14 ‘Labour Ofﬁcial Sold Permits’ Kathimerini March 15 2004. The Head of an Athens Pre-
fecture’s labour department and another worker were arrested and charged with forgery,
money-laundering and organised crime. They charged a minimum of €300 to expedite
applications and larger amounts for incomplete applications.
15 Residence permits can, in certain cases, be given out without work permits, so the number
of valid work permits is, presumably, lower. There are no data available in the Ministry of
Labour.
16 The Greek Manpower Agency, a branch of the Ministry of Labour, which was responsible
for implementing green card procedures.Albanian emigration and the Greek labour market: Economic symbiosis and social ambiguity
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Subsequently, the reporting of crime statistics created a ‘moral panic’ in Greek so-
ciety about the level of crime caused by immigrants, and Albanians in particular.
There were repeated claims, such as that reported in a leading newspaper, Kathi-
merini, in January 1996, that 60% of all recorded crimes were committed by foreign-
ers, mostly Albanians (Lazaridis and Wickens, 1999: 648). In fact, as demonstrated in
the few scientific analyses of immigrants and crime in Greece,17 the statistics cited
were of ‘persons known to the police’ and not even of immigrants prosecuted for
crimes, let alone convicted of any. Furthermore, detailed analysis of all available evi-
dence suggests that immigrant crime is largely confined to robbery, theft and beggary,
whereas serious crimes (murder, rape) are committed overwhelmingly by Greeks
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2001). However, such was the strength of the mythology created
by the Greek press in the early 1990s that, by 1995, some 90% of the Greek police be-
lieved that the increased crime level was caused by immigrants (Karydis, 1996) and
focused their arrests on this minority – to the great detriment of actually dealing with
rising crime in Greece.
Writing about the ‘social construction’ of burglary in Greece, Bakalaki (2003)
makes an explicit linkage between conceptions of the nation-state as a household op-
erating on the principle of the male line of descent and immigrants as potentially
criminal intruders. Thus, the rise in burglaries over the 1990s is not seen by Greeks as
an aspect of modernisation and increased affluence (one might add to this, as the con-
sequence of massive increased income inequality alongside major increases in the
cost of living) but, rather, as the result of the presence of the ‘other’ – immigrants,
Roma and Muslims.
The mass media have exercised a little more responsibility since about 2000 and
have largely abandoned their stereotyping of immigrants as criminals, but the dam-
age, in terms of public perception, has already been done. There is some evidence to
suggest that Greeks’ increased personal contact with immigrants (Albanians) tends to
weaken or remove negative stereotyping. However, there is a considerable regional
variation across Greece in the perception of immigrants, with the most negative being
found in regions close to the Albanian border and in the city of Thessaloniki (Bald-
win-Edwards and Safilios-Rothschild, 1999: 217-9). A major issue for Greeks is the
lack of legal status of Albanians and others: however, it will be recalled that the great
extent of the illegal presence of immigrants exists largely through the exclusionary
policies of the Greek state and not through the choice or behaviour of immigrants
themselves.
Racism and the social exclusion of Albanians in Greece since 2000
The 2001 census showed that roughly half the Albanian workers in Greece had been
resident for more than five years – a significantly higher proportion than almost all
other nationalities except those from the Philippines. After Greece actually started to
conform to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and permitted all immigrant
17 See, for example, Baldwin-Edwards, 2001; Karydis, 1996.Martin Baldwin-Edwards
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children, regardless of their parents’ legal status, to attend school, the numbers of im-
migrant children have increased by 2002/3 to around 9% of the total school popula-
tion.18 For 1999/2000, there were 46 000 Albanian children and 7 000 ethnic Greek
Albanian children in primary and secondary schools; in 1995/6, these figures were
9 000 and 7 000 respectively (Anthopoulou, 2004). However, these aggregate figures
conceal great difference across Greece since the number of Greek children is in con-
tinuous decline and, in some schools, immigrants, even by 2000, constituted 45% of
the school population (Dimakos and Tasiopoulou, 2003: 309). The major increase
since 1995 has been in ‘non-ethnic Greek’ Albanian children; this reflects the in-
creased family reunification of Albanians, easier access to state schools and a degree
of social integration which could not have been anticipated in the early 1990s.
There has clearly been progress since the early days of Albanian immigration into
Greece and the recorded harsh conditions of Albanians in Athens (Psimmenos, 1995).
Yet, there remain substantial issues of racial discrimination and social exclusion, in
particular directed at Albanians. As Albanians have carved out a niche for themselves
in the Greek economy, principally through tough, exploitative employment with long
hours, a stereotypical ‘Albanian worker’ has emerged – one who is:
Employed on a day basis, is being transferred across different places, has ephemeral relations
while economic relations are not limited to work objectives but… include the social and per-
sonal spheres (Psimmenos and Kassimati, 2004).
Similarly, ‘working like an Albanian’ means working with no public or personal
life, with no aims or plans and being completely disoriented from place and belong-
ing. Furthermore, this reputation for hard work is not accompanied by social respect
from Greeks: indeed, it is explicitly linked with disdain for those who have low status
work. Status (and not ability or experience) tends to be a qualifying condition for de-
cent employment in Greece and almost automatically excludes almost all foreigners
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2002). Aside from Albanians’ lowly employment status, the pre-
carious legal status of six-month and one-year permits, or no legal permit at all, along
with the reported cases of Greek police tearing up valid permits in order to humiliate
Albanian immigrants, all of these are an expression of the exercise of Greek hegem-
onic power.
In the social sphere, there are comparable phenomena. Within state schools, re-
search on the racism exhibited by Greek pupils towards their immigrant peers shows
extraordinarily negative opinions, with no variations according to school attainment
or the socio-economic background of Greek children. Their negative views are linked
with criminality, employment-taking and diseases of immigrants: the only positive
comments made are of immigrants’ cheap labour (Dimakos and Tasiopoulou, 2003:
313). These gloomy findings are consistent with recent serious problems concerning
the right to carry the flag, held by the student with the highest marks – a ceremony tra-
ditionally carried out in celebration of the refusal by Greece to allow Mussolini to oc-
cupy Greece in WWII. Clearly the flag is a Greek flag and despite, a 2001 law giving
18 Own calculations from unpublished data.Albanian emigration and the Greek labour market: Economic symbiosis and social ambiguity
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immigrant children the right to carry it, in several schools in northern Greece, Alba-
nian children were stopped by their Greek peers and parents from exercising this
right.19
In the housing market, it is still quite normal to see advertisements, both in the
press and also on the street, saying ‘For Rent: No Immigrants’. Interviews with Alba-
nians show that denial of housing occurs systematically and is a serious problem in
finding accommodation (Hatziprokopiou, 2003: 1  045). Thus, immigrants have
started to cluster in ethnic ghettos which are primarily the run-down areas of Athens
and other cities; however, even where they are permitted to rent, landlords have re-
cently started to demand much higher rents than they would of Greeks. The division
of cities into areas of class or ethnicity is a new phenomenon in Greece, which had al-
ways followed the Mediterranean city paradigm of mixed neighbourhoods (Leonti-
dou, 1985). Also emerging are partially-hidden ethnic economies, involving many na-
tionalities in self-supporting micro-systems of economic survival in an increasingly
expensive Greece.20 Immigrant networks, from the very first, have proved important
to all migrants in Greece and have now developed into sophisticated information ma-
chinery and support mechanisms (Hatziprokopiou, 2003: 1 049-51).
Finally, concerning social relations, it is clear that, generally, immigrants occupy
a distinct social space – even claiming specific geographical locations such as squares
for meeting and finding work. Pavlou cites a case in 1997 when local Greeks wanted
to ‘cleanse’ the squares and public places of immigrants when Thessaloniki was the
Cultural Capital of Europe (Pavlou, 2001: 140). Albanians, along with other national-
ities, have been observed as changing their names into a Greek form in order better to
be accepted by the Greek community (Labrianidis and Lyberaki, 2001: 174). Another
integration strategy has been noted by Hatziprokopiou (2003: 1 050-1) in which Alba-
nian Muslim families arrange to have their children baptised as Greek Orthodox, an
occasion central to Greek national identity and which requires a Greek godfather to
look after the child’s interests throughout childhood and adulthood. Inter-marriage
between Albanians and Greeks would be a good indicator of the extent of social inte-
gration but, while it seems that there has been some inter-marrying, particularly in ru-
ral areas where young male farmers were left with no potential wives because of in-
ternal migration by young women (Kassimis et al., 2001), there are no data and no
investigations on the issue. Generally, Albanians and Greeks do not mix socially and
it is likely that mixed marriages are specific cases of close employment co-operation
between Greeks and Albanians.
Some concluding thoughts
In my opening paragraph, I warned that intra-Balkan migrations are, inevitably, dif-
ferent from other, more normal, patterns of migration. Greece has shown herself in
the management of immigration clearly to be pre-eminently a Balkan rather than Eu-
19 For a detailed report on this and the extensive press coverage, see Baldwin-Edwards
(2003).
20 As always, there is little or no research done on these issues in Greece.Martin Baldwin-Edwards
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ropean country, with the emphasis on nationalist history, state corruption, the lack of
individual rights and an arrogant disregard for facts or statistical data. In one sense,
Albanians are culturally suited to the Greek environment, owing to similar histories
and cultures: in another, their historical and cultural proximity means that they cannot
be accepted as Albanians. In line with the ‘ethnic cleansing’ so predominant in the
Balkans, whether it be through state violence (as in Serbia), through exchanged popu-
lations (as with Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria) or through forced assimilation into a
national culture (as in Greece), it seems that Greeks cannot tolerate Albanians resid-
ing in the country. Their very presence challenges the foundations of a supposedly de-
Balkanised modern Greece, as do the claims of Slavic Greeks in Macedonia and of
Turks in Thrace.
Following the unique logic of modern Greek Balkanism, there are nothing but
contradictions in the relationship of Greece and Greek people to Albanian migrants. It
may be helpful to enumerate a few of these. Firstly, Greek people want legalised im-
migrants, but the Greek state wants illegal/semi-legal ones that it can control and ma-
nipulate or expel. Secondly, the Greek economy needs temporary, semi-skilled work-
ers – maybe seasonal or pendular migrants – for many unfilled jobs, yet the Greek
state (OAED) in its legalisation initiative preferred family men who have now
brought over their families. Thirdly, both the Greek public and the government have
feared permanent Albanian migration, yet they have prevented the circular migration
of workers between Albania and Greece and encouraged family migration. The list of
contradictions is almost endless: there is, in fact, no coherent policy on immigration,
and neither are there even policy objectives on the issue.
Turning to the northern border regions of Greece, we have seen that it is there that
exist the most extreme forms of Greek nationalism and the greatest problems for Al-
banian migrants. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is in exactly these border re-
gions where the involvement of Albanians in the economy – even as employers of
Greeks – is extensive and developed. The Greek state shows no interest in this matter
and there is no information or serious research on it. Another major issue is the impor-
tance of remittances from Albanian migrant workers, which can help to promote the
much-needed economic development of Albania. The Greek state has shown no inter-
est in this matter and, again, there are no data. However, in the public debate over the
last six months, when the idea of Albanian workers ‘taking money out of Greece’ has
been discussed, a popular indignation occurred. Clearly, the thinking was that this is
‘Greek money’ which ‘belongs in Greece’. There was no public discussion of re-
gional economic development, of helping our neighbours the Albanians, or even of
encouraging Albanians to stay in Albania. Nor was there any recollection of when
Greece itself used to be supported by migrants’ remittances. The fundamental issue
was a nationalist one, of Greeks first. In fact, this seems to be the fundamental
premise of all discussions on migration: facts, statistical data and serious independent
research obstruct nationalist propaganda and political rhetoric. Perhaps, in the home-
land of Plato and Aristotle, truth has been the real casualty of this Balkan comic trag-
edy.Albanian emigration and the Greek labour market: Economic symbiosis and social ambiguity
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